Authoritarianism, Threat, and Intolerance

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One of the most important contributions of John Sullivan, James Piereson, and George Marcus's (1982) research on political tolerance was the demonstration that intolerance can be ideologically symmetrical: when liberals are confronted with a group they strongly dislike they will often deny that group fundamental rights to freedom of expression just as conservatives would for groups they dislike. Their methodological innovation – the least-liked group method – and the analyses using it helped to remedy the long-standing belief that intolerance is found largely on the political right that emerged from studies that used exclusively left-wing target groups.

While this research showed that highly disliked and threatening groups often evoke political intolerance, it also demonstrated there are substantial individual differences in how intolerant people become under these conditions. Central to the multivariate model of tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, and Piereson 1981) was the construct of "psychological security." In the final model estimates psychological security had both a direct effect on tolerance and a pronounced indirect effect through support for general norms of tolerance.[1] It thus accounted for a large fraction of the variance in intolerance. However, psychological security was not clearly theorized or measured in this research. Empirically, psychological security was a latent factor with four observed variables: dogmatism, self-esteem, trust in people, and self-actualization values. In the model, psychological security was effectively the common variance among these four somewhat disparate variables. This makes it somewhat difficult to understand the construct in terms of other psychological constructs and theories.

Given the importance of explaining individual difference in intolerance, we need to look more closely at the nature of this key psychological construct. I suggest that re-conceptualizing psychological security in terms of a modern understanding of authoritarianism can be useful in a number of ways. First, there is a long and rich literature on authoritarianism that provides evidence about its determinants and effects. The work of Altemeyer (1988), for example, has shown that people high in authoritarianism are prone to intolerance and willing to support punitive policies toward those they dislike. Second, recent work on authoritarianism has

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[1] There was also a second indirect effect through both ideology and general tolerance norms but the contribution through this path was not very large.

provided a conceptualization of the construct that avoids many of the problems in early work on this topic. Third, there is a growing body of research using a short, relatively unobtrusive measure that is easily incorporated in survey based studies. And forth, this conceptualization of authoritarianism provides a way of understanding how intolerance can be linked to threat and social change, thus providing a more dynamic interpretation of the conditions that increase or decrease tolerance.

The Conceptualization of Authoritarianism

A number of recent efforts to develop a theoretical foundation for authoritarianism have identified the basic characteristics of this trait in strikingly similar ways (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005). An early, clear statement of the core authoritarianism dimension by Duckitt (1989, 71) defines the end points of the continuum as:

> At one extreme would be the belief that the purely personal needs, inclinations, and values of group members should be subordinated as completely as possible to the cohesion of the group and its requirements. At the other extreme would be the belief that the requirements of group cohesion should be subordinated as completely as possible to the autonomy and self-regulation of the individual member.

To better understand the nature of this construct it is important to see why a dimension defined by these opposing extremes should exist. I suggest that the tension between group cohesion and individual autonomy is a characteristic dilemma of human society that is reflected in people's relative value preferences. As Nunn, Crocket, and Williams (1978, 7) state: "every society inevitably confronts the problem of how much individual freedom is possible and how much social control is needed."

What is the nature of this tension? For those who wish to maximize personal autonomy the concern is constraints on behavior. Those constraints could be a result of the behavior of others in society. Crime and violence, for example, can limit the ability of people to pursue freely their personal goals. A more general fear is the set of rules and restrictions that all societies place on behavior that can potentially limit individual freedom.

It is easy to understand why people would want to maximize their freedom and autonomy and limit societal restrictions on their behavior. The opposite end of the authoritarian dimension may be more puzzling. What would motivate people to accept, or even to desire, limitations their freedom in order to achieve group cohesion? Why should ordinary people worry about group cohesion?

The best way to understand this tradeoff is by thinking about the importance of social stability. As social theorists have long argued, a fundamental problem for any society is the maintenance of social order. Although it is common to think of social order in terms of the potential for crime and violence, at a more basic level the social order can be thought of as a stable and predictable pattern of interactions among members of society (Wrong 1994). There are three major mechanisms that can maintain social order: force, mutual self-interest, or adherence to a common set of norms (Wrong 1994).

For those who have a charitable view of human nature, there may be no need for societal rules that go beyond those necessary to protect life and make commerce possible. The classical liberal perspective posits that individuals pursuing their self-interest will lead to a stable social order (Gray 1995). The desire to maximize personal freedom in the absence of strictly enforced rules thus requires having faith that people can create a stable, safe society with a minimum of social regulation of their behavior: Most people can know how to act properly in the absence of enforced rules to guide their behavior

However, a somewhat less positive view might easily lead to doubts about the ability of self-interest to sustain a stable social order on its own. Even if you do not believe that people are malevolent or anti-social by nature, it is easy to be skeptical of the consequences of millions of people all pursuing their self-interest. Social theorists since Parsons (1937) have argued that a stable social order is sustained, at least in part, by the existence of social norms that guide the interactions of the members of that society. It is this common set of values and norms that helps to maintain social stability (Wrong 1994, Etzioni 1996). Adherence to common norms is thus the major alternative to the constant use (or threat) of force for those who lack confidence in the ability of self-directed individuals to create social order. While this discussion about social order may sound too abstract, it is not hard to imagine that many people could be instinctively wary of maintaining order and stability in society without widely accepted rules governing behavior.

The distribution of people across this authoritarianism dimension will be determined by the relative weight of these two beliefs – personal autonomy versus social conformity. Many people are likely to see merit in balancing personal autonomy and the need for norms to regulate behavior. This should result in a moderate location on the authoritarianism dimension that can leave them potentially sensitive to both values. In contrast, some people will so strongly desire personal freedom and autonomy that it will dominate norm enforcement while others will fear the consequences of unlimited freedom and trade-off a large measure of it for the security of socially conformity.

There is a substantial amount of evidence in research on human values that the tension between autonomy and social conformity is reflected in relative value priorities in all societies. In sociology, Kohn (1977, 1983) studied societal values by probing the values that people consider most important for raising children. Based on a number of national surveys, Kohn (Kohn and Schooler 1983, 283) concluded that "there is a self-direction/conformity dimension to parental values in all industrialized countries that have to our knowledge been studied and even one society (Taiwan) that was, at the time of inquiry, less industrialized." Although he had his respondents rank-order child-rearing values, Kohn was clear that conformity and self-direction are part of a broader view of what those children should grow up to be like and, therefore, what values should apply to society more generally. Kohn's research also demonstrates that child-rearing values can be used as a good, unobtrusive measure of people's more general value preferences on this dimension.

In psychology, Schwartz has developed and tested the most comprehensive current model of human values. In a first major comparative study, Schwartz (1992) had respondents rate 56 values including ones measuring social conformity (obedient, self-discipline, politeness, and honoring parents and elders) and self-direction (creativity, freedom, choosing own goals, curious, and independent) in forty samples drawn from twenty countries. Analyzing two-dimensional configurations of the 56 values, he found that the conformity and self-direction values formed distinct clusters virtually everywhere. More importantly, they also appear in regions almost directly opposite each other. One of the axes that help define the cross-national two dimensional scaling solution is anchored by self-direction and its close neighbor stimulation (varied life, exciting life) at one end, and conformity along with security (social order, family security) at the other.

More recent research with a different measurement instrument and new samples largely replicates the previous result. Values associated with conformity and respect for tradition appear in two dimensional space directly opposite of values tapping self-direction and stimulation (Schwartz et al. 2012). Rating one of these sets of values very highly is consistently related to much lower ratings of the set of values.

While few people will be able to articulate a coherent philosophy that reconciles these conflicting values, the implicit tug of war between these goals will result in people adopting orientations toward the world that reflects their preferred balance between them. The tension between these two sets of values produces a dimension very similar to the definition offered by Duckitt (above) anchored at one end by the desire for unlimited personal autonomy and at the other by strict conformity to societal norms of behavior.

It is the relative priorities attached to the values of social conformity and personal autonomy that defines this dimension. In isolation, most people are likely to place a high value on personal autonomy, particularly in an individualistic society like the U.S. The key to this conceptualization is the ways in which people respond when they are forced to confront the trade-off between these values. How highly will people value personal autonomy when it comes into conflict with their desire for social conformity?

Social Conformity/Autonomy and Intolerance

By this definition, there should be a clear relationship between authoritarianism and political tolerance. The nature of these opposing values should lead people at opposite ends of the authoritarianism dimension to have very different perspectives on basic issues of freedom and openness to the free expression of political views. Among those people who value personal autonomy over social conformity there should be a strong aversion to rules and to having to obey the dictates of society. Freedom of expression and behavior should be widely supported, at least in the abstract.

What about those who strongly value social conformity? Although a preference for social conformity over personal autonomy does not mean that people are completely opposed to freedom of expression, they should have a strong desire to limit diversity in society. Diversity is both a potential threat to the maintenance of social order and an indicator that people are not conforming.

For those high in authoritarianism, it is critical that people respect and obey traditional social norms

and rules. If necessary, that means that the threat of sanctions and the use of punishments may be necessary to keep people from misbehaving. People who value social conformity should therefore be strong supporters of the government's power to suppress nonconformity. They should be much more likely than those who value autonomy to follow the lead of the government when it wants to increase its control over social behavior and punish nonconformity.

It is also important to insure that people are generally obedient. Encouraging a duty to follow social norms greatly facilitates social conformity since the motivation to conform becomes internal. If people are sufficiently deferential to social norms, you don't need to monitor everyone or use coercion to keep people in line. For similar reasons, if you don't believe that people are naturally inclined to conform, the way they are raised becomes important. Children should be trained to be obedient, to not challenge authority, and to accept the way society is. (This provides additional support for using child-rearing values as an indicator of social values more generally.)

Authoritarianism and Threat

It would be easy to conclude from this discussion that there should be a simple, unconditional relationship between authoritarianism and intolerance. However, the relationship is more complex: The willingness of people to limit political freedom should depend on how they respond to threats to their values. As Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus clearly demonstrated, people on the right and left can become intolerant when confronted with personally objectionable groups. Under what conditions should we observe intolerance across the authoritarianism spectrum?

Consider first those who value autonomy over social conformity. As just noted, an obvious prediction is that such people would be highly tolerant and supportive of civil liberties. Believing in the need for individual freedom, opposed toward rules that restrict behavior, and relatively unconcerned with challenges social conformity, there seems to be little impetus toward intolerance. Should these people be absolute supporters of civil liberties?

To answer this question, it is important to note the difference between social conformity and social order more generally. Just because people who value autonomy do not feel the need to defend social

conformity does not mean that they are oblivious to the need to maintain a stable and safe social order. While a major threat to individual freedom may come from rules and regulations enforced by the government, the actions of other people – conflict and violence – may also limit the pursuit of individual autonomy.

This suggests that there are conditions under which those who value autonomy over social conformity may become intolerant. This should result from the belief that, left unchecked, the actions of some people or group could significantly reduce their freedom of or be a direct threat to their lives. Violence and social disorder can create conditions that make individual freedom increasingly difficult to pursue. Crime and terrorism are potential threats to the freedom of people to pursue their goals. Or, a group's ideology may include repression of freedom and dissent. While those who strongly value autonomy should be generally tolerant, there are certain types of threats that can activate intolerance and make them appear to be "authoritarian." This is consistent with Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) findings that the perceived personal threat of terrorism increased support for policies that undermine civil liberties and use force instead of diplomacy only among those low in authoritarianism.

The motivation for restricting behavior is very different among those who value social conformity and therefore the dynamics of intolerance will be different. Most importantly, the desire for social freedom is now less important than the enforcement of social norms and rules. While those who value autonomy will be most concerned with threats to personal freedom, those at the other end of the continuum will direct their intolerance toward those who challenge traditional norms and values.

What could be seen as a threat to common norms and values? Most obviously, beliefs, values, and behavior that are perceived to be inconsistent with those norms, as well as behavior that is a challenge to the government's ability to enforce compliance with social rules and regulations. Since social conformity is important to the maintenance of social order, any action that may challenge conformity — either by advocating nonconformity or simply by being nonconformist — could be seen as a threat.

Intolerance among those who value social conformity over autonomy should be a function of the degree of perceived threat to common norms and traditional values. As a social or political group deviates from social conventionality they will be seen as a danger and will motivate support to suppress the threat. It is

possible that there will be support for some restrictions on the rights of groups that are not obviously nonconformists since those who value social conformity should support government restrictions on social behavior in general. However, absent some combination of nonconformity and challenging behavior, those who value social conformity should be only somewhat more intolerant than those who seek personal autonomy.

Since the goal of those who value social conformity is to protect common norms, we should find that the desire to repress all sorts of nonconformity will increase as the perception of threats to social conformity increases. Perceived threats may be more diffuse than those presented by any specific group. For example, increasing diversity in society, be it social, demographic, or political, should be seen as a threat and therefore increase intolerance among those high in authoritarianism (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Stenner 2005; Duckitt 2006; Cohrs and Asbrock 2009; Cohrs and Ibler 2009; Roccato, Vieno, and Russo 2014; Johnston, Newman, Valez 2015; Valez and Lavine forthcoming).

The role of perceived threat in the dynamics of intolerance highlights a critical feature of this view of authoritarianism: the effect of authoritarianism should be contingent. In statistical terms, there should be an interaction between those who value conformity and perceptions of threat. Absent any threat there should be only a weak effect of social conformity-autonomy on intolerance. In that sense, the social conformity-autonomy dimension is a predisposition to respond. People who value social conformity are predisposed to be intolerant but may not be intolerant without the required threat, whether it is a particular group that is threatening or a perception that social order is in danger more generally. Alternatively, people who value autonomy may become intolerant when they perceive threats to their personal freedom.

This doesn't mean that social threat is always necessary in order to observe a relationship between authoritarianism and political attitudes. Since people who value social conformity should be strongly committed to traditional norms and values, there may be a relatively constant association between authoritarianism and conservative positions on social/moral issues like abortion, gay marriage, and pornography to the extent to which they are seen as social norms. How intolerant and punitive people high in authoritarianism become is more likely to be a function of the degree to which they perceive the social order

is being threatened.

This distinction between the social conformity-autonomy dimension that forms the basis of authoritarianism and the observed intolerance and prejudice among those high in authoritarianism is consistent with recent studies that have developed distinct subscales from traditional authoritarianism items. In the standard approach to measuring authoritarianism (see Altemeyer 1988), the three facets of the trait — authoritarian submission (desire for conformity and respect for authorities), authoritarian aggression (intolerance and prejudice), and traditionalism (adherence to traditional values or social conservatism) are assumed to form a single latent dimension. This is the basis of the widely used Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA) developed by Altemeyer (1988). As Duckitt (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krause, and Heled 2010; Duckitt and Bizumic 2013) have shown, with items written to distinctly measure each facet of authoritarianism it is possible to consistently derive a three-factor solution that distinguishes each of those dimensions. This research has also shown that, while the authoritarian submission and aggression factors are generally positively correlated (increasing support for social and political conformity is correlated with intolerance and prejudice), the magnitude of this correlation varies substantially across nations. This reinforces the need to consider the factors that moderate the relationship between authoritarian predispositions (social conformity-autonomy) and intolerance.

Authoritarianism and Intolerance in Contemporary U.S. Politics

If people high in authoritarianism value social conformity and are concerned about the maintenance of common social norms, a multitude of forces instigating social and cultural change in the U.S. should be highly threatening right now. Demographic changes are steadily decreasing the relative size of the white, Anglo population and are projected to shrink it to minority status by the middle of this century. The growth of the Latino population is exposing more and more white Americans to Spanish speakers. Significant changes in social and moral norms are also increasingly evident. The rapid increases in support for gay marriage (and the Supreme Court decision legalizing gay marriage nationally), the legalization of marijuana on a state by state basis, the growth in the visibility of the transgender population and the concurrent debates over transgender rights, and the continuing push for gender equality in business and politics are just some of

the major forces that are challenging a broad set of "traditional" social norms that many older Americans would have grown up with. The confluence of these factors should be presenting a substantial threat to people who strongly value social conformity.

In addition to the factors increasing threat to values of high authoritarians, the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump has brought to light the potential appeal of a politician who uses campaign rhetoric that attacks outgroups (Mexicans, Muslims) and suggests intolerance and punitiveness (questioning freedom of the press and calls for more law and order).

In the remainder of this chapter I will use data from 2016 to examine the contemporary relationship between authoritarianism and intolerance (as well as the use of force to deal with threats).

Data and Measures

The data for this paper come from an internet survey of 1763 registered voters conducted February 15-16, 2016. The data were collected by Morning Consult (morningconsult.com) for Vox.com. [2] The survey was in the field just after the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. Given the focus on cultural and social threats to authoritarians, the analysis is limited to 1562 whites in the sample.

The measure of authoritarianism used in the analysis is constructed from four questions that contrast pairs of child-rearing values.[3] Respondents were asked to choose which is more important to them: independence or respect for elders; obedience or self-reliance; being considerate or well-behaved; and curiosity or good manners. Authoritarians should select respect for elders, obedience, well-behaved, and good manners. A don't know option was provided and was used by 3 to 4% of people across the questions. Each question was coded so that the authoritarian option was equal to 1 and the non-authoritarian option was 0 (don't know responses were coded as .5). A scale was created by averaging across the four questions. The sample is well distributed across the range of the measure, as shown in Figure 1. The sizeable number of

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[2] I would like to thank Amanda Taub for her role in designing the study and for obtaining permission for me to use the data.

[3] More precisely, it is a measure of authoritarian predispositions. In terms of the broader authoritarianism literature, this is close to what is typically called authoritarian submission. This measure has been used in a number of studies of authoritarianism (see Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; and Hetherington and Suhay 2011). Coefficient alpha for the scale is .57.

respondents in both extreme categories does indicate a truncation of variance in the measure that may lead to some underestimate of its effects. [4]

Figure 1: Distribution of Authoritarianism Scale

I will examine the effects of authoritarianism on measures of contemporary intolerance and willingness to punish threatening groups. In the survey, respondents were asked whether they strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the following five policies:

Using military force over diplomacy against countries that threaten the United States.

Changing the Constitution to bar citizenship for children of illegal immigrants.

Extra airport checks on passengers who appear to be of Middle-Eastern descent to curb terrorism.

The federal government program in which all phone calls are scanned to see if any calls are going to a phone number linked to terrorism.

Requiring that all citizens carry a national identity card at all times to show to a police office on request to curb terrorism.

Two additional questions asked whether each of the following is very good, good, neutral, bad or very bad for America:

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[4] For example, some of the people who score highest (4) on this measure would likely be even more extreme if there were additional items to detect that level of authoritarianism.

Limits on police officers' authority to use force in response to recent allegations of police brutality.

American Muslim communities building more mosques in American cities.

Taken together, these 7 questions broadly tap a willingness to restrict the civil liberties of Americans or members of minority groups and support for using force against those who might be threatening (countries that threaten the U.S. or potential criminals who might be African-American). [5]

In the following analyses I also control for a core set of demographic variables: gender, education, age, income, and religiosity. [6] I do not control for either partisanship or ideology. As I will show, both partisanship and ideology in the U.S. are significantly related to authoritarianism. Including those variables as controls would therefore somewhat obscure the effects of authoritarianism on the intolerance measures.

I will conclude by examining the effects of authoritarianism and intolerance on support for Donald Trump among Republicans in the 2016 primary season. This will provide an opportunity to consider the effects of these factors on support for a presidential candidate whose rhetoric should be appealing to voters who feel threatened by the social and cultural changes that the U.S. is undergoing.

Analysis

Since each of the dependent variables is categorical I model them using ordered probit. The coefficient estimates for all of the dependent variables are in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. I present the marginal effects of the authoritarianism measure for each dependent variable in graphical form in Figures 2 through 4.

Figure 2 shows the marginal effects of authoritarianism on the predicted probability of supporting: A, extra airport checks on passengers who appear to be of Middle-Eastern descent to curb terrorism; B, the federal government scanning phone calls to see if any calls are going to a phone number linked to terrorism;

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[5] The mean inter-item correlation among these 7 items is .29.
[6] Education is measured in nine categories ranging from 1-8 years to graduate/professional degree. Income is measured in nine categories ranging from under $20,000 to $250,000 or more. Religiosity is a question asking respondents to report how important religion is in their life. Response categories range from not important at all to extremely important. Authoritarianism is significantly higher among men, it is negatively related to education, and it is positively related to religiosity.

and C, requiring all citizens carry a national identity card at all times to show to a police office on request to curb terrorism. Overall, there is least support for having the federal government monitor phone calls, more support for national ID cards, and somewhat more support for profiling people from the Middle-East in airports. In all three cases, support increases substantively and significantly as authoritarianism increases. People high in authoritarianism are particularly likely to want those who appear to be Middle-Eastern given special attention at airports and many have little problem with government monitoring phone calls or requiring national identification cards.

Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism on Airport Checks on Middle-Eastern Passengers, Monitoring Phone Calls, and Requiring National ID Cards

Figure 3 shows the marginal effect plots for: A, changing the Constitution to bar citizenship for children of illegal immigrants; and B, believing that Muslim communities building more mosques in American cities is bad for America. In general, the respondents were opposed to barring citizenship for children of illegal immigrants and did not think that building mosques is bad for the U.S. In each case, however, authoritarianism is related to opposition to citizenship and mosques. Opposition to mosques is significantly correlated with authoritarianism and the probability of opposing citizenship for children of illegal immigrants doubles as authoritarianism varies across its range.

Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism on Barring Citizenship for Children of Illegal Immigrants and Opposing Muslims Building Mosques in American Cities


Note: Each graph shows the predicted probability for the dependent variable as the authoritarianism measure varies across its range. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval. The predicted probabilities are computed from the coefficients in columns 4 and 5 of Table A1.

Marginal effects for A, limits to police officers' use of force; and B, using military force rather than diplomacy against countries that threaten the U.S. are presented in Figure 4. Responses to both of these questions are significantly related to authoritarianism. The willingness to use force against other countries is

especially related to authoritarianism with substantial levels of support among people high on the child-rearing measure.

Overall, if these seven questions are combined into a single additive measure of intolerance and punitiveness (alpha = .74), there is a correlation of .38 between this measure and the authoritarianism scale. In a simple two-factor latent variable model that corrects for measurement error, the estimated correlation is .55.

Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism on Limiting Police Use of Force and Using Military Force Against Countries that Threaten the U.S.

Note: Each graph shows the predicted probability for the dependent variable as the authoritarianism measure varies across its range. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval. The predicted probabilities are computed from the coefficients in columns 6 and 7 of Table A1.

Finally, the survey also asked respondents whether they have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable view of Donald Trump (as well as Jeb Bush, Ben Carson, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and John Kasich). Since very few Democrats in this sample had favorable views of Trump and the survey was conducted during the early stages of the 2016 primaries, I restrict this analysis to respondents who identified as Republicans. And, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) have well documented, it is also harder to estimate the effects of authoritarianism on vote choice across the political spectrum since authoritarianism is increasingly related to partisanship and ideology in the U.S. In these data, authoritarianism

is a strong predictor of both party identification and ideological self-placement. Using the same specification from the previous models, the predicted probability of identifying as a Republican increases from .21 to .39 across the range of the authoritarianism measures and the predicted probability of being conservative doubles – from .14 to .29. Controlling for partisanship and ideology can thus partially obscure the effects of authoritarianism since they already incorporate some of its influence.

Figure 5 shows the results of ordered probit models predicting favorability ratings Donald Trump. [7] In panel A I plot the marginal effect of the authoritarianism measure on the probability of viewing Trump favorably holding constant age, education, income, gender, and religiosity. Panel B shows the marginal effect of the seven item intolerance/punitiveness scale on Trump favorability when that scale is added to the previous model. The marginal effect of authoritarianism in panel A is positive and significant – favorable attitudes toward Trump among Republicans increase as they become more authoritarian. At the lowest level of authoritarianism the predicted probability of rating Trump favorably is .48; it increases to .73 at the highest level of authoritarianism. It is also important to note that similar models for Bush, Carson, Cruz, Kasich, and Rubio (not shown here) find no positive effect of authoritarianism. (The coefficients for Carson and Kasich are negative and significant.)

[7] Parameter estimates for these two models are shown in Table A2.

Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism and Intolerance on Favorability Ratings of Donald Trump Among Republicans

Note: Each graph shows the predicted probability for the dependent variable as the authoritarianism measure varies across its range. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval. The predicted probabilities are computed from the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 of Table A2.

Panel B shows a much larger marginal effect for the tolerance/punitiveness scale. As this scale varies from the 1st percentile (0) to the 99th percentile (.79), the predicted probability of seeing Trump favorably increases from .26 to .83 among Republicans. The effect of this measure is indistinguishable from zero for the other Republican candidates except for Ben Carson, where the marginal effect is about half of this size. Support for Donald Trump among Republicans in February 2016 was very strongly related to preferences for profiling Middle-Eastern looking passengers at airports and denying citizenship to children of illegal immigrants born in the U.S., opposition to building mosques, supporting programs to issue national identification cards and monitor phone calls to deter terrorism, and support for the use of force by police officers and the U.S. military.

Conclusions

It would be a gross oversimplification to suggest that authoritarianism — or any single factor — was sufficient to account for the observed variation in political tolerance. I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter that authoritarianism should be a central part of any explanation of the psychological dynamics

underlying intolerance. The core of the construct, the tension between the values of personal autonomy and social conformity, has direct connections to the motivation to either permit or restrict the free expression of political and social speech. I have also shown how each of these values can be threatened by different situations. Intolerance among people high in authoritarianism will be activated by threats to the social order — nonconformity, disobedience, diversity. While the data I used in this paper cannot directly examine this interaction between authoritarianism and social threat, there are a number of studies that have shown how authoritarian predispositions can be triggered by a variety of social threats including ethnic and racial diversity in the U.S. (Johnston, Newman, and Valez 2015; Valez and Lavine forthcoming).

I have also tried to clarify the effects of threats on people low in authoritarianism. Just as those high in authoritarianism are expected to become more intolerant when their core values — the desire for social conformity — are threatened, people low in authoritarianism should be particularly sensitive to threats to their personal autonomy. Crime, violence, terrorism, and extreme right-wing groups could be seen as threat to autonomy and freedom. And people low in authoritarianism may become more intolerant when so threatened (Hethertington and Suhay 2011). More generally, this analysis highlights the need to think more carefully about the concept of "threat" in order to better specify the ways in which particular threats may affect different people (Feldman 2013).

Another potential advantage of focusing on authoritarianism in a model of tolerance is that there is a large body of research showing robust relationships between authoritarianism and other personality variables: openness to experience (Sibley and Duckitt 2008), dogmatism (Altemeyer 1996), and need for cognitive closure (Webster and Kruglanski 1994) are among the most prominent of these well documented associations. More generally, there is also evidence that authoritarianism has a sizable heritable component approaching that of core personality factors like the Big Five (McCourt et al. 1999; Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 2013). Genetically based analyses also suggest that authoritarianism may be connected to other political and social orientations at a very deep level (Ludeke, Johnson, and Bouchard 2013). It is therefore

possible that authoritarianism could be the crucial link that connects these other psychological factors to intolerance.

The analysis presented here has demonstrated some of the broad effects of authoritarianism on measures of intolerance and willingness to use force in a recent sample of adult Americans. Instead of focusing my analysis on the more common used questions that tap the willingness to grant disliked groups freedom of expression I cast the net more broadly to determine how Americans who vary in authoritarianism respond to current controversies that reflect their support for policies that would limit the rights of certain Americans or use force to punish those who may be threatening. The authoritarianism measure was a significant predictor of each of the seven questions used in the analysis. In several cases, the probability of supporting restrictions on rights or use of force doubled as scores on the authoritarianism measure varied from the lowest to highest score. Compared to those low in authoritarianism, people high are more likely to want to profile airline passengers who appear to be Middle-Eastern and to oppose allowing Muslim to build mosques. They want to deny citizenship for children of illegal immigrants born in the U.S. and they support the use wire taps and national identity cards to deal with the threat of terrorism. They also favor using military force over diplomacy in international affairs and do not want to limit police officer's use of force despite allegations of brutality. These effects are likely somewhat underestimated in this analysis given the limited range of the authoritarianism measure. One with more gradations would probably find even larger differences between low and high scores.

Finally, the analysis of Republican identifiers in February of 2016 found a significant effect of authoritarianism on evaluations of Donald Trump. He was the only candidate in the Republican primary field for whom there was a significant effect of authoritarianism on evaluations among potential Republican voters. The most striking results come from the model of Trump evaluations that includes a summary scale of the seven intolerance/punitiveness items. Favorable evaluations of Trump are very strongly related to overall scores on this measure. Those Republicans who scored low were very unlikely to rate Trump positively (probability of .25) while those high on the measure had an estimated probability of greater than .8 of viewing Trump favorably.

An important question for democratic theory is whether liberal democracies can contain authoritarian and intolerant impulses among members of the public. Politics in liberal democracies may be generally effective in keeping overt expression of intolerance out of electoral politics and public rhetoric as politicians attempt to secure the votes of a majority of the public, particularly in national elections. As the evidence presented here shows, however, under some circumstances a national candidate can mobilize the support of people high in authoritarianism and intolerance through fairly explicit appeals. Even though Republicans are, on average, higher in authoritarianism than Democrats, the authoritarianism measure in this analysis uniquely predicted positive evaluations of Trump among potential Republican primary voters. The summary intolerance and punitiveness measure was an extremely good predictor of support for him. With evidence suggesting growing support for populist authoritarian politicians in a number of nations (Norris 2016), we need a better understanding of when authoritarian predispositions and intolerance can be turned into direct electoral support for such politicians and parties (Tillman 2015).

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Appendix

Table A1: Parameter Estimates for Intolerance and Use of Force Questions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Authoritarianism	.87 (.10)	.60 (.10)	.67 (.10)	.77 (.10)	.57 (.10)	.52 (.10)	.93 (.10)
Female	-.01 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.10 (.06)	-.06 (.06)	.10 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.07 (.06)
Education	-.07 (.02)	.01 (.02)	-.06 (.02)	.05 (.02)	-.08 (.02)	-.06 (.02)	-.11 (.02)
Age (10 Years)	.10 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.05 (.02)	.11 (.02)	.07 (.02)	.02 (.02)
Income	.03 (.02)	.04 (.02)	.04 (.02)	.07 (.02)	.04 (.02)	.08 (.02)	.06 (.02)
Religiosity	.51 (.09)	.21 (.09)	.35 (.09)	.17 (.09)	.42 (.09)	.44 (.09)	.63 (.09)
Threshold 1	-.05	.21	-.28	.14	-.65	-.17	-.57
Threshold 2	.75	.89	.37	.89	.00	.49	.28
Threshold 3	1.61	1.72	1.19	1.64	1.07	1.08	1.19
Threshold 4					1.57	1.77	

Note: Entries are maximum likelihood, ordered probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in each column is:

1. Extra airport checks on passengers who appear to be of Middle-Eastern descent to curb terrorism.

2. The federal government program in which all phone calls are scanned to see if any calls are going to a phone number linked to terrorism.

3. Requiring that all citizens carry a national identity card at all times to show to a police office on request to curb terrorism.

4. Changing the Constitution to bar citizenship for children of illegal immigrants.

5. American Muslim communities building more mosques in American cities.

6. Limits on police officers' authority to use force in response to recent allegations of police brutality.

7. Using military force over diplomacy against countries that threaten the United States.

Table A2: Parameter Estimates for Trump Favorability Question Among Republicans

	1	2
Intolerance		1.74 (.27)
Authoritarianism	.60 (.17)	.43 (.17)
Female	-.18 (.09)	-.26 (.10)
Education	-.05 (.03)	-.04 (.03)
Age (10 years)	.03 (.03)	-.01 (.02)
Income	-.03 (.03)	-.04 (.03)
Religiosity	-.43 (.15)	-.51 (.15)
Threshold 1	-1.05	-.37
Threshold 2	-.62	.07
Threshold 3	.07	.81

Note: Entries are maximum likelihood, ordered probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in each column is: For each person, please indicate if you have a Very Favorable, Somewhat Favorable, Somewhat Unfavorable, or Very Unfavorable opinion of each individual — Donald Trump.