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Mass Political Behavior

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Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes

► *Political Attitudes, Values, and Ideology*

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to count the number of political attitudes that a person develops throughout his lifetime. Political figures, groups, government policies, and policy proposals are just some of the potential elements of the political landscape that people may come to evaluate. While many of these attitudes might be interesting to study on their own, a great deal of research in political psychology has been devoted to finding the sources of structure for political attitudes. Given the complexity of politics, the ambiguity of much political information, and relatively low levels of political knowledge among members of the public, it would be easy to believe that these attitudes are unstructured and relatively unpredictable. Although there is still considerable debate about the typical magnitude of political attitude structure, it is clear that people's political evaluations are at least somewhat predictable and the relationships among them far exceed chance. There are many potential sources of structure that probably interact in complex ways. Partisanship, for example, provides many with a baseline for evaluating candidates for political office and the policies they propose. Similarly, social group identities may allow people to determine what is in the best interest of their group.

A focus on the structure of political attitudes naturally raises the question of the role of ideology. References to ideology have abounded in discussions of politics over the past three hundred years. The language and rhetoric of politicians and journalists often suggests that evaluations of politics should be organized along a left-right or liberal-conservative dimension. Many models of voting behavior and partisan competition have assumed that parties and voters can be located in some simple ideological space (Downs, 1957).

Although politicians, philosophers, and social scientists often discuss politics as if it were organized on a single left-right dimension, 50 years of research on public opinion shows that a unidimensional model of ideology is a poor description of political attitudes for the overwhelming proportion of people virtually everywhere (Kinder, 1998). This conclusion is not simply a result of research based on attitude surveys (see, for example, Converse, 1964). Even in-depth interview studies show that people rarely use any

simple, overarching standard for evaluating politics (Hochschild, 1981; Lane, 1960).

Evidence for the existence of ideological structure among political attitudes depends in part on the research approach. When correlations among political attitudes—typically issue preferences—are computed, there is virtually always some evidence of ideological consistency. While the magnitude of these correlations varies considerably from study to study and country to country (see Knutsen, 1995a, for a good summary), the pattern of relationships among issue preferences is generally consistent with a traditional left-right dimension. However, even when correlations reach the .5 level (as they sometimes do in Europe but rarely in the U.S.), less than 25 percent of the variance in issue positions is being explained by a left-right factor.

While correlations among attitudes may be consistent with an ideological dimension, they do not demonstrate that people are actively using ideology to structure those attitudes. In a classic article, Converse (1964) forcefully argued that the liberal-conservative dimension was not a major source of attitude constraint for most Americans. Large majorities of people could not adequately define the terms *liberal* and *conservative*, and only a small group of people appeared to use the liberal-conservative continuum in their evaluations of political candidates and parties. Analysis of data from other countries supports the same conclusion. For example, Dalton (2002) reports that in data collected in 1974–75 only 21 percent of people in the United States and Great Britain used ideological concepts to evaluate the political parties while 34 percent of West Germans did so.

When asked to, many people are willing to place themselves on scales representing the left-right or liberal-conservative continuum. And these self-placements do help to predict policy preferences (Jacoby, 1991). However, evidence suggests that ideological self-placements do not necessarily reflect the use of ideological concepts. Conover and Feldman (1981) found that liberal-conservative self-placements in the United States were largely a function of attitudes toward salient social and political groups. It is therefore possible for people to utilize ideological labels without a working knowledge of the logic of a political ideology.

While it is easy enough to imagine, from a psychological perspective, how individuals could get along without using ideology to understand politics, this does create significant difficulties for politics. If political attitudes are not generally structured by any common ideology, how do political leaders communicate with the public? Absent ideology, it is difficult for candidates to judge what positions will appeal to the majority of the electorate. It is even more difficult to see how political parties can be organized without some consistent basis for distinguishing themselves from each other. Politics doesn't seem to "work" without some structure that allows broad sets of policies to somehow go together. And democratic representation may depend on people having some understanding of that structure. If a simple ideological continuum is not a good model for understanding how people

organize their political attitudes, is there some alternative that can provide the basis for political communications and competition?

One potentially valuable approach to the attitude organization problem that has not received sufficient attention in the political psychology literature is based on the values construct. Theorists and researchers in philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and psychology have long discussed the role of values in human life (see Rohan, 2000, for a review). As generalized standards, values are assumed to be "the criteria people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people (including the self) and events" (Schwartz, 1992, p. 1). Rokeach (1973) began his major study of values by asserting that "it is difficult for me to conceive of any problem social scientists might be interested in that would not deeply implicate human values" (p. ix).

Many researchers have argued that values are the ultimate underpinnings of attitudes. Bem (1970) described how attitudes emerge from syllogistic-like reasoning that leads, finally, to some value. Tetlock's (2000) value pluralism model assumes that "underlying all political belief systems are ultimate or terminal values that specify the end-states of public policy. These values—which may take such diverse forms as economic efficiency, social equality, individual freedom, crime control, national security, and racial purity—function as the back stops of belief systems" (p. 247).

Values have characteristics that appear to lend themselves to the analysis of political attitudes and behavior. Values are assumed to be relatively few in number, certainly far fewer than the number of attitudes that a person may hold. Thus they could provide a basis for reducing the complexity of political judgments and for creating consistency among attitudes. On the other hand, all discussions of values suggest that they are more numerous than the single ideological dimension that is typically used to understand political conflict. Political attitudes that are structured by values may not exhibit any simple unidimensional structure. In addition, many theorists argue that values exist not in isolation but as systems. If there is indeed an organization to the values people hold, this may provide an even simpler structure for political attitudes—and an underlying basis for political ideology. Finally, values are also assumed to be relatively stable, a property necessary for them to act as ongoing standards of evaluation. Value priorities may change slowly over time, as may be necessary for people adapting to a nonconstant environment. They should be inertial enough, however, to lend stability to evaluations and behavior.

The structure of values, the overall relationships among them, may be critical for the development of theories of political attitudes. This possibility also highlights a major difference in the approaches typically used by political scientists and psychologists. Much of the research that uses values as predictors of political attitudes commonly includes one or more values that are considered to be most relevant to the attitudes being studied. This is particularly true in political science. Psychologists have been much more

concerned with identifying the entire range of human values and the relationships among those values. The piecemeal approach to values, while having produced a large body of interesting research, leaves open the possibility that important effects of values on political attitudes are missed. Perhaps more important, an understanding of the overall structure of values and value systems may yield insights into the nature of attitudinal structure and ideology.

Another way values can be useful in understanding political processes is by providing a link between the societal and individual levels. Researchers have not only attempted to study the values that people hold but also to map differing patterns of values across societies. In addition to variation in values across individuals in a society, there appears to be mean differences in value priorities across people living in different societies. An interesting question is whether value differences across societies are simply a function of other identifiable characteristics, or if societal values themselves exert an ongoing influence on individual values. The existence of societal values also has implications for the sources of structure underlying political attitudes.

▀ *Definitions of Values*

Despite decades of research using values, the definition and operationalization of the construct continues to be one of the major problems facing researchers. And for values to be useful in explanations of other political cognitions, it is necessary to clearly distinguish them from constructs like attitudes and beliefs. This is not an easy task in public opinion research since all cognitions—including values—must be inferred from responses to stimuli, typically verbal responses.

How do we distinguish values from other cognitions, like beliefs and attitudes? As Bem (1970) notes, values are, like attitudes, fundamentally evaluative and, in contrast to attitudes, are relatively few and more central. Two definitions from prominent values researchers give a good sense of the contemporary use of the construct. According to Rokeach (1973), a “*value* is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A *value system* is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance” (p. 5). For Schwartz (1992), “values (1) are concepts or beliefs, (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (5) are ordered by relative importance. Values, understood this way, differ from attitudes primarily in their generality or abstractness (feature 3) and in their hierarchical ordering by importance (feature 5)” (p. 4).

In principle, then, the distinction between attitudes and values is clear.

Attitudes refer to evaluations of specific objects while values are much more general standards used as a basis for numerous specific evaluations across situations. As Rohan (2000) argues: “when the values construct is viewed in terms of an abstract meaning-producing cognitive structure, the divide between value priorities and evaluations of specific entities seems wide indeed” (p. 258). Still, if that divide is potentially wide enough to create a clear distinction, it is not necessarily true that the gap will always be so wide in every instance. At what level of generality does an attitude become a value?

Since values refer to a preferable mode of conduct or desirable end-state, it is likely that an individual will positively evaluate a sizable number of values, perhaps giving no value an unambiguously negative assessment. It is therefore common to speak of value *priorities*: the relative endorsement of values with respect to each other. People may think that, taken individually, ambition, success, responsibility, and social justice are all desirable values. Yet one person may attach a higher priority to ambition and success while another person may see responsibility and social justice as more important.

The idea that values are ordered in terms of priorities raises two important issues. First, if most values are positively evaluated, it is likely that many specific assessments require the resolution of conflicts between values (see Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996). Specific “attitudes and behaviors are guided not by the priority given to a single value but by tradeoffs among competing values that are implicated simultaneously in a behavior or attitudes” (Schwartz, 1996, p. 2). Second, if people must prioritize a number of values, it suggests that it may be best to think in terms of value systems. Values may not exist in isolation from each other but, owing to the potential conflicts among them, may be linked in some sort of general configuration. If values do exist within overall systems and often are in conflict with each other, research that focuses on a small number of values may miss the conflicts and tension that Tetlock and Schwartz have argued are central to the dynamics of values.

▀ *Early Approaches to Values*

Theory and research on values developed in the twentieth century at the intersection of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. The absence of any agreement about the identification of human values led to measurement instruments (and research) that were generally noncomparable. Investigators used very different approaches in their study of values. While much interesting research was produced, each contribution remained relatively isolated.

For example, on the basis of the work of Spranger, *Types of Men* (1928), Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey (1960) developed the Study of Values instru-

ment (the first version was published in 1931). Their measure attempted to tap six broad value orientations based on ideal types of people: the theoretical person, the economic person, the aesthetic person, the social person, the political person, and the religious person. Prior to the 1970s, this was probably the most widely used values measure.

Starting from a very different perspective, Morris (1956) developed a measure based on 13 "ways to live" presented as paragraph-long descriptions that were rated on the basis of how much each subject liked or disliked each description. The wide range of value types allowed the measure to be used across diverse cultures (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991). On the basis of from student samples in the United States, Morris was able to reduce the information in the 13 ratings to five basic factors: social restraint and self-control, enjoyment and progress in action, withdrawal and self-sufficiency, receptivity and sympathetic concern, and self-indulgence.

A third example, from sociology, is the study *Variations in Value Orientations* by F. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). This research explored differences in values across "cultures" in the U.S. Southwest. The researchers administered structured interviews to samples of American Indians, Spanish Americans, Mormons, and Texas and Oklahoma farmers. The measures were designed to tap five broad value orientations defined by the questions: (1) What is the character of innate human nature? (2) What is the relationship of man to nature? (3) What is the temporal focus of human life? (4) What is the modality of human activity? and (5) What is the modality of man's relationship to other men? (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961, p 11). Their research focused on finding characteristic value orientations within each community and exploring differences across the communities.

▲ Milton Rokeach

There is no question that research on values over the past 30 years has been influenced tremendously by the work of Milton Rokeach, especially in psychology. His 1973 book *The Nature of Human Values* provided a huge impetus to the empirical study of values. Rokeach devoted the first chapter of his book to a careful conceptual discussion of values and value systems. His measure of values helped standardize empirical research. It became widely used in psychology and has served as the basis for subsequent value instruments. He also conducted a number of studies demonstrating the properties of his measure of values, the impact of values on attitudes and behavior, and processes of value change. As any review of the literature on values since 1973 will easily demonstrate, Rokeach's conceptualization and measurement of values has been a major inspiration for researchers.

One of Rokeach's major contributions was to highlight the overall structure of value systems. Values don't exist in isolation, and rarely will any single attitude or behavior be a function of just one value. Rokeach

was not simply trying to study *some* values, his goal was to identify *all* of the major values that exist across human cultures. He approached this problem by assuming that values were relatively few in number. How few? Rokeach never gives a precise answer to this question, nor does he provide a clear mechanism for obtaining the answer. Rokeach did suggest that the number of human values should be related to basic biological and social needs, although he did not really follow through with this line of reasoning.

Rokeach's identification of the number of values was, in the end, intimately bound up with his development of a measure of values. In fact, while Rokeach devoted a great deal of attention to the conceptualization of values and value systems, it was his measure of values that ultimately had the greatest impact. The Rokeach value measure was actually two measures, constructed to distinguish between instrumental and terminal values.¹ Each measure included a list of 18 values with each value given a short one- or two-word label with a further clarification in parentheses, for example: freedom (independence, free choice). Consistent with the idea that all (or almost all) values are positively evaluated, subjects are asked to "arrange them in order of importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 27). This is an attempt to avoid the problem of having subjects rate all the values as highly important to them, thus yielding little variance. Later research has begun to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of using ranking procedures like this to measure value priorities (see Alwin & Krosnick, 1985).

It seems odd in retrospect that Rokeach used such ad hoc procedures to develop his value measures, since he was concerned about tapping the entire range of values that might be found among all people everywhere. Given the substantial amount of work that Rokeach put into the measurement and study of values, the "intuitive" development of the list of values in his final measure must be considered a major limitation. It clearly leaves open the possibility that his values measure is not complete, and researchers soon suggested omissions that would significantly increase the number of values that a respondent would have to rank (see Braithwaite & Law, 1985).

Although it was probably deficient in many ways, it is difficult to overestimate Rokeach's contribution. He provided a clear conceptualization of values and value systems. His measure was widely used in psychology and became the basis for other value measures. His research demonstrated the usefulness of examining the effects of large systems of values on attitudes and behaviors. Other researchers have used the foundation he constructed to improve on the study of values.

▲ Shalom Schwartz

If Rokeach motivated much of the recent psychological research on values, the work of Shalom Schwartz seems to be becoming the new standard for

researchers in psychology. While I will focus on his theory and measurement of values, Schwartz is interested more generally in the effects of values on attitudes and behaviors, the origins of values in people's shared and unique experiences, and crosscultural differences in value priorities.

Given Schwartz's interest in crosscultural differences in values, the first task he set himself was to specify and test a universal structure of values. While this was one of Rokeach's original goals as well, the absence of a working theory of value structure in his research prevented him from knowing whether he had accomplished it.² Schwartz begins by developing a theory that specifies the *types of values* that should be found in all human societies (see Schwartz & Bilsky 1987, 1990). To do this he goes back to Rokeach's observation that values should emerge out of basic biological and social needs. Schwartz reasons that underlying specific values are a smaller number of goals or motivations. In particular, he argues (1992) that "values represent, in the form of conscious goals, three universal requirements of human existence to which all individuals and societies must be responsive: needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups" (p. 4). While many people have suggested that values are based on a set of universal human needs or motivations, Schwartz has attempted to build a comprehensive theory of values by specifying these needs.

Using this framework, and samples drawn from 20 countries, a set of 10 motivational types of values was derived.³ These value types are intended to represent basic human motivations or goals. Individual value items (freedom, equality) derive their meaning from the motivation they represent. To identify these value types, Schwartz used 21 of the Rokeach value items and added a number of others drawn from studies of values outside the United States. The set of 10 value types and individual values contained within each type are shown in Table 14.1. The value types are more general than the individual values in Rokeach's measure. In fact, the single value items that Rokeach used become indicators of the value type for Schwartz. For example, while Rokeach considered freedom and independence to be distinct values, for Schwartz these are both indicators of the self-direction value type.

Schwartz's model simultaneously reduces the number of fundamental value types to 10 and increases the number of individual values. Rokeach's value measure included 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values. Schwartz's measure includes 54 (or more) individual value items. While the increase in the number of value items seems inconsistent with the idea that there should be a relatively small number of values, Schwartz focuses on the 10 value types and is less concerned with the number of individual items. Since having subjects rank a list of 54 values would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, subjects are asked to rate each value individually on a scale ranging from 7, "of supreme importance," through 0, "not important," to -1, "opposed to my values."

Table 14.1
Schwartz Value Types and Items

1. Self-direction: independent thought and action (creativity, freedom, choosing own goals, curious, independent)
2. Stimulation: variety, novelty, challenge (a varied life, an exciting life, daring)
3. Hedonism: pleasure, gratification (pleasure, enjoying life)
4. Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence (ambitious, successful, capable, influential)
5. Power: social status, prestige, dominance and control (authority, wealth, social power, preserving my public image, social recognition)
6. Security: safety, harmony, stability of society (social order, family security, national security, reciprocation of favors, clean, sense of belonging, healthy)
7. Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to harm others and violate social expectations or norms (obedient, self-discipline, politeness, honoring parents and elders)
8. Tradition: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion impose on the individual (respect for tradition, humble, devout, accepting my portion in life, moderate)
9. Benevolence: concern for the welfare of close others in everyday interaction (helpful, loyal, forgiving, honest, responsible, true friendship, mature love)
10. Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of <i>all</i> people and for nature (broadminded, social justice, equality, world at peace, world of beauty, unity with nature, wisdom, protecting the environment)

Schwartz's conceptualization of values is interesting because it seems to suggest how value *systems* are organized. By understanding value types in terms of basic human and social needs, he is able to specify relationships among the 10 value types: which values types are most compatible and which are most opposed. For example, benevolence and universalism should be compatible since they both reflect (different aspects of) prosocial orientations. On the other hand, universalism and power should stand in opposition to each other, since power involves the accumulation of individual dominance and control of resources, while universalism is concerned with protecting the welfare of all people. These relationships suggest that the individual value items should be arrayed in two-dimensional space, with the 10 value types emerging as areas in that space with compatible values next to each other and opposing values opposite.

To test this model of value structure, Schwartz took the correlations among ratings of each value and analyzed them using a multidimensional scaling algorithm. As shown in figure 14.1, a two-dimensional configuration of the 54 values from 40 samples taken from 20 countries shows the (largely) expected pattern. The individual value items are distributed across the space, which is then divided as a pie cut into 9 pieces, with one of those pieces further divided into two—the tradition and conformity value types.




Figure 14.1. Analysis based on a multidimensional scaling algorithm. (I would like to thank Shalom Schwartz for permission to reprint Figure 2 from Schwartz, 1994.)

It is important to recognize that the lines dividing the space into the value types are not a function of the analysis but rather an interpretation of the multidimensional scaling solution. This means that, empirically, the value types are a inference from the clustering of the individual values in the two-dimensional space. While the location of the individual items in the space is a function of the observed correlations among the ratings of each, the division of the space into the value types is conceptual and other researchers could divide up the space differently. For example, the angles defining the hedonism and stimulation types are relatively small compared with the angles defining the universalism and benevolence types. Are hedonism and stimulation distinct value types, or should the clusters of values in this space represent a single type? As Schwartz (1992) notes,

what this means is that the partition lines in the SSAs [Smallest Space Analyses] represent conceptually convenient decisions about where one type of motivation ends and another begins. Because the array of values represents a continuum of motivations, the precise locations of the partition lines are arbitrary. Values found near a partition line express a combination of the related motivational goals associated with the value types on both sides of that partition line. (p. 45)

A two-dimensional space can also be defined by two axes crossing at the center of the space. Schwartz proposes two such dimensions that suggest an even simpler understanding of overall value structure. One dimension, running from self-direction and stimulation at one end through security, conformity, and tradition is labeled openness to change versus conservation. The second, self-transcendence versus self-enhancement, is located at an approximately 90 degree angle to the first and has the universalism and benevolence value types at one end and achievement and power at the other. As I will discuss in more detail shortly, this two-dimensional solution provides an interesting way to view the structure of values and the possible relationship between values and fundamental social and political processes.

Much more research is clearly necessary to validate Schwartz's conceptualization of value structure and to determine whether this is, in fact, a universal model of values. Schwartz presents some results that suggest that the 10 value types may not be quite universal. The model only partly replicates in several samples from China, and some other value types do appear in those samples. It is too soon to know, however, whether these are just sampling issues or whether they will replicate with other Chinese samples and in other populations. It is also difficult to know whether any variations across cultures are the result of true cultural variations in the structure of values or of problems in translating the values instrument into different languages.

Schwartz's conceptualization has the advantage of being based on an analysis of the motivations underlying values so that the resulting conceptualization is less ad hoc than previous ones. The hypothesized motivational

basis of the value types should also make it easier to generate hypotheses relating value types with specific attitudes and behaviors. The relatively small number of value types also means that models of political attitudes based on values can reduce the complexity of such explanations down to 10 or fewer value types or even two underlying dimensions.

On the other hand, it is less clear what the status of individual values is in this conceptualization. Consider, for example, the universalism value type. It includes the individual values of *equality*, *unity with nature*, *world at peace*, and others. Their proximity in the two-dimensional space is a result of their being rated similarly by people. Thus it is likely that if someone rates *equality* highly she will also give a high rating to *world at peace*. A measure of the universalism value type would be based on the sum of a person's ratings of these different values. However, it is possible that specific attitudes would be better predicted by one or the other of these individual values rather than the overall universalism value type. For example, attitudes toward social welfare spending might be strongly predicted by *equality* but not by *world at peace*. To what extent should political psychologists be interested in the relationship between political attitudes and very precisely defined values like equality or more general motivational types like universalism?

▲ Values, Political Attitudes, and Political Reasoning

Numerous research studies have found evidence of relationships between values and political attitudes. It would take many pages just to list the published studies that have presented data on this issue. The quality of this evidence varies considerably. In some cases it is no more than bivariate correlations between a value and an attitude, with no statistical controls for other variables. In other cases, complex multivariate models are estimated that control for many other variables and take into account measurement error. Since values are likely to be correlated with many other factors that could predict political attitudes, it is difficult to have confidence in results based only on correlations.

Even if only multivariate studies are considered, it is clear that there is abundant evidence that values and attitudes are related. Research has demonstrated consistent effects of values on policy preferences (Feldman 1988; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Pollock, Lilie, & Vitte, 1993; Zaller, 1992), attitudes toward social groups (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995), political action (Borg, 1995; Gundelach, 1995), and politicians and parties (Knutsen, 1995b; Miller & Shanks, 1996).

Despite the collective empirical evidence, we still have little systematic evidence of the relationships among many of the values that theorists like Rokeach and Schwartz have proposed and political attitudes. Most studies

examining the effects of values typically choose a small number (perhaps only one) and estimate their effects on political attitudes. A study of attitudes toward social welfare attitudes might include values like equality and individualism while an examination of attitudes toward abortion might focus on religious values and tradition. Specifications of values and their measurement often vary considerably from study to study. Rarely are a full battery of values (or value types) like those of Schwartz included. Evidence on the relationship of values and political attitudes thus accumulates in a piecemeal fashion, shedding little light on the broader effects of values.

Schwartz (1996) has argued that his two-dimensional structure of 10 value types predicts that attitudes should be related to the entire set of value types in a clearly identifiable pattern. Correlations of attitudes with the values should increase and decrease uniformly across adjacent values. Schwartz provides evidence of this pattern with data on cooperation, vote choice, and intergroup contact. For example, the reported willingness of Israeli (Jewish) public school teachers to have contact with Israeli Arabs is most positively correlated with the universalism value type ($r = .40$) and the adjacent self-direction values ($r = .32$). The correlations decline to the maximum negative correlation of $-.41$ with the traditional value type, and correlations of $-.31$ and $-.19$ with the adjacent security and conformity values. Although this analysis again presents only simple correlations between the values and the dependent variables without any statistical controls, it suggests that the prediction of attitudes from a system of values is likely to be better and more informative than predictions from one or several individual values.

Unfortunately, there is still little theory that specifies how values or value structures should be related to political attitudes. Schwartz's model provides predictions about the patterns of correlations of attitudes with his 10 value types, once he identifies the value types that should have the most positive and most negative correlations with each particular attitude. While there may be a strong intuition about these relationships, there is no theory that generates such predictions. As Rokeach (1973) noted, "the values that people hold are conceived to be the explanations of the attitudes they hold (and the behaviors they engage in), but which values underlie which attitudes (and behaviors), and why? At this stage of theory and research, we simply do not know enough about the nature of values and how they determine attitudes and behavior to answer questions of this kind satisfactorily" (pp. 120–121).

Researchers also have not devoted enough attention to the conditions under which values will be strongly related to political attitudes. Most studies examine simple relationships without testing any contingencies that would influence the magnitude of the relationship. One factor for which there is some evidence is political sophistication. Although it may be plausible to assume that the value-attitude connection should be simple enough to require little sophistication, Zaller (1991, 1992) has argued that the

relationship between values and political attitudes will depend on levels of political sophistication. Those who are less sophisticated will be unable to connect the cues in the political messages they receive with their values and thus will fail to form strong relationships between their values and attitudes.

While Zaller provides evidence showing that relationships between values and attitudes grow stronger with increasing political sophistication, Pollock, Lilie, and Vitte (1993) suggest that the moderating effect of sophistication may depend on the nature of the attitudes. Following Carmines and Stimson (1980), they distinguish between "hard" and "easy" issues. Easy issues have "literal referents that directly evoke moralistic or economic values" (Pollock, Lilie, & Vitte, 1993, p. 30). These are "symbolic" issues that are likely to be familiar to most people. As a result they are easily understood and connected with major values.

Hard issues, those that are more technical and less familiar, require that political elites frame them in terms of values and that people to have sufficiently high levels of political sophistication to understand those frames. We should therefore find robust relationships between easy issues and values that are not moderated by sophistication and more tenuous connections for hard issues that emerge only for those who are politically sophisticated.

Pollock, Lilie, and Vitte provide some evidence for these hypotheses, on the basis of a analysis of attitudes toward nuclear energy (a hard issue) and the "easy issues" of abortion, flag burning, and homosexuality. They find that the relationship between values and attitudes toward nuclear energy is substantially larger for those who score high on political involvement than those score low. However, the effects of values are still generally statistically significant even among those who are low in involvement. In contrast, there is little evidence that the relationship between values and attitudes toward the easy issues is affected by levels of involvement. This study suggests that the role of sophistication in the relationship between values and attitudes is somewhat complex. Analyses of influence of values need to consider attributes of the political attitudes under study, as well as the nature of elite discourse and media presentation of the issues involved.

Another factor that may play a role in the relationship of values and attitudes is the motivational basis of the attitudes. Some attitude theorists have proposed models of the psychological functions of attitudes (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956). Katz's model suggests that there are four main attitude functions: utilitarian, ego-defensive, knowledge, and value-expressive. The *utilitarian* function involves the maximization of rewards and minimization of negative reinforcements; the *ego-defensive* function serves to protect the ego from threats and impulses; the *knowledge* function serves to give meaning and understanding of the environment; and the *value-expressive* function helps to express basic values and self-concept. Recent research suggests that the functions that attitudes serve may influence the relationship between values and attitudes (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1998; Maio & Olsen, 1994, 1995). In particular, value-expressive attitudes

should exhibit much stronger connections to values than attitudes serving other functions.

Two studies by Maio and Olson provide evidence of the importance of attitude function. In the first study, of attitudes toward smoking (Maio & Olson, 1994), they measured attitude function using a thought-listing approach (see Shavitt, 1990). They found significant relationships between several values and attitudes among people with value-expressive attitudes but no relationship among those with utilitarian attitudes. In the second study they manipulated the functions of attitudes toward cancer by making salient either value expressive or utilitarian reasons for donating to cancer research. As expected, Maio and Olson found substantial differences in the predictors of attitudes in the two conditions, with one of Schwartz's value dimensions—self-enhancement versus self-transcendence—correlating with attitudes in the value-expressive condition but not at all in the utilitarian condition.

The functional approach to attitudes could make a potentially important contribution to a better understanding of the role of values in politics. We need to know when political attitudes will serve a primary function of expressing core values and the self-concept. Certain attitudes may be more likely to function in this way, and there may be conditions under which the value-expressive function becomes more important. The distinction between value-expressive and utilitarian functions seems particularly critical for politics, since one of the major controversies in the political behavior and public opinion literature has been the relative influence of self-interest versus "symbolism" in political attitudes. Self-interest should be associated with attitudes that serve a utilitarian function. Although it is somewhat less clear, symbolic attitudes are likely to be more value expressive in nature. To the extent to which this distinction is meaningful, symbolic attitudes should be strongly predicted by values. And, given the difficulties of linking self-interest and political attitudes (Sears & Funk, 1991), political attitudes may be especially likely to serve a value-expressive function for many people.

► *Values and Political ideology*

The preceding section reviewed evidence on the relationship between values and specific political attitudes. If most people do not think about politics in ideological terms, values may allow people to organize their political evaluations in a relatively consistent manner. But it is also necessary to consider how the structure of these attitudes relates to political conflict in the society. If people were to draw on a large number of values or if people varied significantly in their use of values, the resulting complexity would make the relationships among the public, parties, and politicians tenuous. Indeed, this is the attractiveness of the ideology construct: it allows easy communication between politicians and the public and provides a basis for

the organization of political parties. It is therefore important to look beyond simple relationships between values and attitudes to see if values can provide this more general level of structure for political attitudes.

Several researchers have attempted to create connections between values and political ideology by arguing that certain values may form the very basis for differences among ideologies. Rokeach presented a simple model of value-based ideology in *The Nature of Human Values*. He began by arguing that the four major twentieth-century ideologies—socialism, communism, fascism, and capitalism—are best understood from a two-dimensional perspective. According to Rokeach, the unequal distribution of power in every society will lead to competing proposals to deal with social and economic problems. The nature of these conflicts will be expressed in terms of differing levels of satisfaction with the amount of freedom and inequity in society. Thus the major differences between ideologies should be defined by the priorities placed on the key values of freedom and equality.

On the basis of this logic, Rokeach argued that the two dimensions underlying modern ideologies are formed by these two values. This two-dimensional model yields four cells created by high and low priorities attached to each value. Socialism is located in the high-equality, high-freedom cell while fascism is in the low-equality, low-freedom cell. Communism occupies the high-equality, low-freedom cell and capitalism is in the low-equality, high-freedom cell.

To test this model, Rokeach (1973) conducted a content analysis of samples of the writings of key representatives of these four ideological positions. The content analysis counted positive and negative mentions of all terminal and instrumental values including, freedom and equality. This analysis provided considerable support for Rokeach's model, with the ranking of the values in the selected writings matching the predictions in each case.

In addition to the content analysis of political leaders, Rokeach also measured the value priorities of samples of Americans and their presidential preferences in 1968. As opposed to the content analyses of the values of major ideological figures, the value priorities of the supporters of the various presidential candidates could easily be arrayed on a single left-right dimension. This was possible because all of the groups ranked freedom highly (between 1 and 4 among all 18 terminal values). What distinguished them was the priority they placed on equality. Supporters of liberal candidates like Robert Kennedy, Eugene McCarthy, and Hubert Humphrey ranked equality near the top of the list while supporters of the conservative candidates, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George Wallace, ranked equality much lower. On the basis of these findings, Rokeach argued that the two-dimensional ideological space could reduce to one dimension when there is little variance on one of the values (in this case, freedom).

Rokeach's findings on the impact of equality on candidate choice anticipated a great deal of research that demonstrates the importance of this value for political attitudes. Studies in the United States have shown that

equality is a major predictor of social welfare attitudes (Feldman, 1988; Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001; Kluegel & Smith, 1986), racial attitudes (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000), and candidate evaluation (Miller & Shanks, 1996). Verba and his colleagues (1987) demonstrated the centrality of equality to politics in the United States, Sweden, and Japan. Research in Europe finds substantial effects of the traditional left-right dimension, which is frequently interpreted (at least in part) as reflecting the value of equality (see Knutsen, 1995a).

Although Rokeach's two-value model is a parsimonious way of explaining modern political ideologies, there are significant problems with it. First, the meaning of values like freedom and equality can shift from one setting to another. Freedom in particular is a difficult value to pin down in the abstract. For a capitalist, freedom is the absence of coercion, particularly from the government. For a socialist, freedom is being able to accomplish your goals, and this may require government efforts to remove barriers like poverty and racism. Subscribers to all ideologies can therefore value freedom as long as it is interpreted to their liking.

Second, while Rokeach obtained evidence consistent with his model from an analysis of the writings of major political figures and theorist, value rankings from supporters of these ideologies are not consistent with the major predictions. Rokeach's finding that, in the United States, only the priority attached to equality is related to the variations in ideology may be sensible: without a history of significant support for either communism or fascism, ideological debate reduces to a single dimension opposing socialism (or, in the U.S., liberalism) with capitalism (conservatism). The role of freedom should, however, emerge in a context in which communist and fascist ideologies were represented. This was the goal of a study in England conducted by Cochrane, Billig, and Hogg (1979). From samples of local activists and supporters of the Labour, Conservative, Communist, and National Front parties, these researchers obtained rankings of values using Rokeach's measure of 18 terminal values. Consistent with Rokeach's findings, equality discriminated most strongly among both activists and supporters. However, freedom did not discriminate at all in the sample of supporters, and the differences in the sample of activists were inconsistent with Rokeach's predictions.

Braithwaite (1982, 1994, 1997) has proposed another approach to the relationship between values and ideology. She began by attempting to correct the limitations of the Rokeach two-value model but has produced a quite different account. After modifying Rokeach's value measure to include more social/political values, Braithwaite factor analyzed responses to those values and obtained two relatively uncorrelated dimensions. The first, labeled *international harmony and equality*, includes the values "a good life for others," "rule by the people," "international cooperation," "social progress and social reform," "a world at peace," "a world of beauty," "human dignity," "equal opportunity," "greater economic equality," and "preserving the

natural environment." The second factor, *national strength and order*, is measured by "national greatness," "national economic development," "the rule of law," "and national security." These two social value factors were then combined with more personal values to create two somewhat broader dimensions, "harmony" and "security" (Braithwaite, 1997).

Braithwaite shows that these two factors are related to different personal values and are relatively uncorrelated (actually somewhat positively correlated). However, as Schwartz (1994) points out, the lack of correlation between the factors may be a methodological artifact. Since almost all values tend to receive positive ratings, there are very few observed negative correlations among any pairs of value items. Therefore, all scales based on ratings of value items will have some induced positive correlation among them. They may appear to be uncorrelated or even positively correlated when the "true" correlation among the constructs could be quite negative.

There are other problems with the evidence that Braithwaite presents for these value factors. One of Rokeach's most interesting arguments was that the very structure of ideology required a two-dimensional model: ideologies cannot be properly arrayed on a single dimension. Yet virtually all of the evidence that Braithwaite reports shows both value dimensions correlated with political attitudes and vote choice. The international harmony and equality dimension is always negatively correlated with conservative attitudes and behavior, and the national strength and order factor is positively correlated. In effect, these two dimensions of values always reduce to a single ideological dimension.

Schwartz's two-dimensional representation provides another perspective on political ideology that appears to have real promise. Recall that in addition to the 10 value types that Schwartz identified, he also showed that two axes seem to fit the overall value configuration: openness to change versus conservation and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement. Schwartz (1994) notes that these two dimensions correspond to two dimensions of ideology. The first, which he labels classical liberalism, "refers to whether government should devote more to guarding and cultivating individual freedoms and civil rights or to protecting the societal status quo by controlling deviance from within or enemies from without" (p. 39). This ideological dimension should be most closely related to the openness to change versus conservation value dimension. The second ideological dimension, economic egalitarianism, "refers to whether government should devote itself more to promoting equality by redistributing resources or to protecting citizens' ability to retain the wealth they generate in order to foster economic growth and efficiency" (p. 40). The self-transcendence versus self-enhancement value dimension should be most closely linked to economic egalitarianism.

There is some evidence that these two value dimensions are associated with other constructs that are strongly linked to political attitudes. Several researchers (Altemeyer, 1998; Rohan & Zanna, 1996) have found that right-

wing authoritarianism is strongly related to the openness to change versus conservation dimension. Its strongest positive correlations are with the conformity and tradition value types, and it is most negatively correlated with the self-direction and stimulation values. Altemeyer also reports evidence suggesting that social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) is related to the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension.

Schwartz's two-dimensional model of values also suggests some interesting variations on these two dimensions. For example, self-transcendence is represented by values from the universalism and benevolence value types. While similar in many respects, universalism has a broader scope compared to the more ingroup focus of benevolence. Similarly, Schwartz finds that at the other end of this dimension power values typically conflict more with benevolence and universalism than achievement values. Thus slight changes in orientation in this two-dimensional space may give rise to different political orientations and ideological preferences. The underlying two-dimensional structure of Schwartz's conceptualization may provide a useful basis for thinking about political and social conflict in society.

▲ *The Stability and Primacy of Values*

For values to help structure political attitudes, it is necessary for them to be more stable than attitudes and for causality to run from values to attitudes. If values were found to be temporally or situationally unstable, or if there were evidence that values were significantly influenced *by* attitudes, it would be difficult to argue that values play a central role in political attitude organization. At a minimum, our understanding of the values-attitude relationship would be substantially complicated. Unfortunately, there is too little empirical evidence to provide firm answers to these critical questions.

All value theorists have assumed that values are *relatively* stable. Completely stable values would be dysfunctional for people, leaving them unable to deal with changes in the world around them. The critical question is how much temporal instability should be observed before values lose their status as enduring standards that shape attitudes and behavior.

Rokeach (1973) presented measures of stability for his values measures by computing rank-order correlations for each instrument over periods of several weeks (and over a year in one case). A perfect rank-order correlation would indicate that an individual ordered the 18 values exactly the same way at the two measurement points. The median correlations were generally in the .7 to .8 range for terminal values. Since these rank-order correlations are computed for each individual, it is possible to examine the distribution of stability, across individuals. While most of the subjects in these studies exhibited fairly high levels of stability, others were significantly more unstable. It is of course possible (even likely) that some of this instability is due to measurement error. However, Rokeach noted that some of the variation

in stability was related to characteristics of the subjects: sex, age, intellectual ability, and liberalism.

These results suggest that there is a substantial degree of stability in the overall configuration of values. What about the individual value items? Rokeach reported test-retest correlations for each value by computing Pearson correlation coefficients for two administrations of the values measures. These correlations varied substantially, from .45 for "responsible" and .51 for "a sense of accomplishment" to .71 for "equality" and .88 for "salvation." The only correlation above .71 was for salvation, and the majority of the correlations were in the .6 range. The individual values thus show greater instability than the entire set of rankings. There should be more measurement error for single value items than for the relative rankings of many values, so these results are not completely surprising. What then do we conclude about the stability of values from results like this? We could be pleased with rank-order correlations for value systems around .8. Should we be concerned to find correlations for individual values of only .6?

Evidence about the stability of other measures of individual values is limited, especially for representative national samples. Such evidence requires that measures of values be included in panel studies. Even when such data is available, conclusions seem to vary substantially. For example, using a four-item Likert-type measure of support for equality of opportunity in the American National Election Studies (NES), McCann (1997) reports a surprisingly low (standardized) stability coefficient of .41 for a two-year interval (1990–92). The stability coefficient for a four-item measure of "moral traditionalism" is much higher, .84. Sheng (1995), using the same data but adding two additional indicators of equality of opportunity, reports a unstandardized stability of .81.⁴ His estimate of the stability of moral traditionalism is 1.00. Both of these estimates take measurement error (random and systematic) into account.

It is clear that we need considerably more empirical evidence on the stability of values. We also need to think more about how stable values should be and what type of measures are being used. Rokeach's results show substantial differences between the stability of (ranked) value systems and individual values. Each of the measures is a single item with very short phrase. The questions used in the NES are statements that respondents agree or disagree with (for example: "It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others."). Should value measures constructed from multiple statements like this be more reliable than single items? Or does the content of the statements make them *more* susceptible to short-term changes?

Do values change systematically in the long term? Rokeach (1973) devoted a great deal of attention to this question. Using a method that provided feedback to subjects about discrepancies between their reported value priorities and their self-concept (the value confrontation method), Rokeach was able to observe systematic changes in value priorities and at-

titudes. Others (e.g., Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996) have noted that this manipulation seems to produce fairly small changes in values.

It is difficult to find good evidence on long-term value change, since this requires reinterviews with people over a substantial time interval. It is much easier to compare value priorities over time using independent samples, but the interpretation of observed changes in data like this is unclear. For example, Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1988) found that the ranking of equality on U.S. national samples decreased significantly from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. While they argued that this was the result of changes in the political environment and elite discourse, there is no way to empirically test such a hypothesis with data like these.

Some evidence of systematic change in values comes from McCann (1997). Using the 1990–92 NES panel data, he showed that people who voted for Bill Clinton in 1992 increased their support for equality of opportunity and decreased their support for moral traditionalism. Those who voted for George Bush shifted their value priorities in the opposite direction. In the absence of other studies like this, it is difficult to know how generalizable these results are.

In addition to stability, values should also be exogenous to attitudes. If values were significantly influenced by attitudes, it would be difficult to view values as a basis for attitude organization. And since most studies of the effects of values on attitudes begin by *assuming* that values are causally prior to attitudes, significant evidence of the endogeneity of values casts doubt on the conclusions of those studies. As with the stability of values, the best way to examine the causal relationship between values and attitudes is with panel data.

McCann's (1997) examination of the NES panel data provides some support for the exogeneity of values. Despite finding that support for equality of opportunity and moral traditionalism were significantly affected by presidential vote preferences, McCann showed that voters' issue preferences had no significant effect on these two values. On the other hand, there were significant effects of the values on a number of issue preferences in 1992, even holding constant the values two years prior. Thus while these values appear to be influenced by preferences for presidential candidates (or some aspect of the election campaign), there is no evidence that values are endogenous to policy preferences—in this one study.

Other researchers are more concerned about the exogeneity of values. Seligman and Katz (1996) present evidence in a series of studies that value systems may not be as stable as many assume. Subjects first completed a Rokeach-like values ranking. Then, after attitudes toward an issue (abortion, the environment) were assessed (along with some filler material), the subjects rank-ordered the values a second time. Half of the subjects were given the same general instructions to rank the values, while the other half were asked to do the ranking in terms of their feelings about the issue. Seligman and Katz found that the correlation between these two rankings was sub-

stantially lower when subjects were asked to express their values in terms of the issue than in the general condition. The correlations between several of the values and issue preferences were also higher in the issue condition.

This study suggests that value priorities may be influenced by contextual factors rather than being stable structures. However, it is difficult to know from these manipulations whether we are observing true changes in value priorities or changes in reported values that are due to the demand characteristics of the studies. Since the subjects are asked to rank the values on the basis of their feelings toward the issue, there are strong pressures to be consistent. In addition, Seligman and Katz added two or three values closely related to the issue to Rokeach's terminal value list. These additional values are most likely to be affected by consistency pressures, and there is some suggestion that a significant amount of the reported value change is due to these additional items.

There are reasons to be concerned about the causal relationships between values and attitudes. As Kristiansen and Zanna (1994) suggest, in the functional approach, attitudes may serve not only a value-expressive function but also an ego-defensive function. Values may be an important way that people justify their attitudes and behaviors. From this perspective, values may be as much a function of attitudes as their cause. This is clearly an area in which more research is needed. Most work on values begins with the assumption that values influence attitudes but not the reverse. At this point, there is little hard evidence to support this assumption.

▀ Societal and Individual Values

In an effort to account for the structure of political attitudes, political psychologists have naturally focused on the value priorities of individuals. Indeed, psychologically, values exist as mental constructs. However, there is a long tradition in the social sciences that has attempted to account for certain characteristics of societies on the basis of shared social values. Much of the early work on this topic was based on simple observation of social behaviors and attitudes (see Lipset, 1979, for a good summary of this approach in the case of the U.S.). More recently, a growing body of quantitative research has examined differences in cultural values and their effects on psychological processes and behavior. For political psychologists, this research raises the interesting possibility of using values to link the micro and macro levels of analysis. To the extent that the value priorities of individuals are shaped by societal values (or by social, economic, and political conditions more generally), the relationships between individual political behavior and social conditions would become clearer. Shared social values would also help us understand how individual values and political attitudes become organized.

To be fully successful, this enterprise requires a clear conceptualization of societal values and the ways they are shaped and maintained. Unfortu-

nately, this is currently a major gap in the literature. Societal values are either taken as a given in order to examine their consequences⁵ or are measured by mean levels of value priorities in (typically) small samples. And while researchers have used a variety of means to explore crosscultural differences in values, they have not really systematically explored how those differences emerge. As a result, much of the research in this area tends to be more descriptive than theoretical. Despite this, it is important to consider whether and how peoples' value priorities may vary across cultures. Given the large number of studies on this topic, it is impossible to even attempt to review this literature in the space available in this chapter. My goal is to raise some key issues and to suggest how this research may help understand the way political attitudes are structured.

Without a doubt, the central value dimension in the crosscultural values literature has been individualism-collectivism. Interest in the nature and consequences of individualism dates from at least the French Revolution. Arguments that politics and society in the United States has been dominated by individualism began to emerge soon after the founding of the nation (see Lipset, 1979; Tocqueville, 1954). Empirical evidence that seemed to support this observation came in 1980 from the research of Geert Hofstede. Using self-completed interviews with workers from 40 countries who were employees of a large multinational corporation, Hofstede extracted four dimensions of societal values: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and individualism. According to Hofstede (1980) individualism "describes the relationship between the individual and the collectivity which prevails in a given society" (p. 213). As defined by Oyserman, Coon, & Kimmelmeier (2002), "the core element of individualism is the assumption that individuals are independent of one another," while "the core element of collectivism is the assumption that groups bind and mutually obligate individuals." (pp. 4-5).

Hofstede's analysis of the workplace data produced a ranking of the 40 nations on his individualism measure. As expected, the United States was the highest in individualism, although Australia and Great Britain scored barely lower. The three next-highest countries were Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. The most collectivist countries were Venezuela, Colombia, Pakistan, Peru, and Taiwan. In general, western, industrialized countries were highest in individualism, especially those with a British heritage. The most collectivist countries were those in South America and Asia. Hofstede's analysis provided researchers with a guide to highly individualist and collectivist nations that could serve as the basis for research into the consequences of individualism.

Whether or not societies differ most prominently in individualism, it is a value with particular importance to political psychology. Ever since the industrial revolution, individualism has been linked to the desire for social mobility and support for a market economy. Individualism should also help shape the way that people respond to poverty and inequality. Individualists

believe that people are ultimately responsible for themselves, and thus society should not have to come the aid of the needy. Collectivists, on the other hand, see the individual as, first and foremost, a member of the social group and someone whose welfare depends on the well-being and actions of the group.

The assumptions that nations differ in levels of individualism and that the ranking of countries in individualism/collectivism can be clearly identified have been crucial to much of the crosscultural values literature. These assumptions were recently put to a rigorous test by Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002), who conducted an extensive meta-analysis of studies that involved comparisons of measures of individualism/collectivism for the United States and at least one other country. Their findings generally supported these assumptions but with significant qualifications. In many cases the differences across countries were smaller than anticipated. And there was considerable diversity across Asian nations: Chinese samples were quite low in individualism, while Japanese and Korean samples were significantly higher.

The relationship between societal values and individual values also requires close attention. It is not clear that there will always be a one-to-one relationship between the cultural values that characterize a society and the value priorities of people in that society. To make the distinction clear, Triandis et al. (1985) introduced the terms *idiocentrism* and *allocentrism* to describe the person-level values corresponding to individualism and collectivism. Triandis and colleagues find that, at the individual level, idiocentrism and allocentrism are not necessarily strongly negatively correlated, even though individualism and collectivism are considered to be opposite ends of a single continuum at the societal level.

The difficulty in moving from the cultural to individual levels may be the reason why measures of individualism in studies of political attitudes in the United States often have weaker-than-expected explanatory power (see Feldman, 1988; Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001; Sears, Henry & Kosterman, 2000; but compare Kinder & Mendelberg, 2000). In these studies it is the value of equality that has a stronger impact on Americans' attitudes toward social welfare policy and race. Although these findings may appear to be inconsistent with the claim that the United States, as a society, is particularly high in individualism, it is possible that these two conclusions are quite compatible: if individualism is a widely shared value in the United States, there may be little real variance to explain differences in political attitudes. Indeed, Feldman and Zaller (1992) found that references to individualism were widespread in open-ended comments about social welfare policies, even among people who supported those policies. We may learn more about the influence of individualism on political attitudes from crossnational research than from studies within any one nation (particularly one very high in individualism). There is some evidence that differences in mean levels of support for individualism are associated with variations in social welfare spending in western, industrialized societies (Smith, 1987).

A different attempt to link social conditions and values comes from the extensive work of Ronald Inglehart. Beginning with simple assumptions about the socialization of value priorities, Inglehart (1977, 1990) developed a model of value change that is associated with the transition from economic scarcity to relative affluence. Inglehart based his model on two assumptions: the *scarcity hypothesis*, that values develop in response to conditions that are in short supply, and the *socialization hypotheses*, that values form during the preadult years and are relatively resistant to change after that. The structure of his model was further elaborated through Abraham Maslow's (1952) hierarchical value theory, which posited that people pursue basic goals in order, from subsistence needs to the need for order, belonging and sociability, self-esteem, and finally postactualization needs. Only as lower order needs become satisfied do individuals turn to succeeding higher order needs. In Inglehart's framework, economic deprivation in the preadult years produces a focus on sustenance and security needs that leads to the development of bourgeois or materialist values. The absence of economic deprivation allows for attention to higher order needs, which results in postbourgeois or postmaterialist values. As economic security in a society increases, more and more young people should develop postmaterialist values and generational turnover should make these values, increasingly prevalent in society.

Inglehart has measured these values by having people (partially) rank-order groups of four value items. His first measure was based on a single group of four: maintain order in the nation, give people more say in the decisions of the government, fight rising prices, and protect freedom of speech. The first and third items are assumed to tap materialist values, the second and fourth postmaterialist values. In subsequent studies up to 12 items were employed. The use of items that referred directly to economic conditions (fight rising prices, maintain a high level of economic growth, maintain a stable economy) has led some (Clarke & Dutt, 1991; Duch & Taylor, 1993) to argue that the proportion of materialist values in a society is a function of short-term economic conditions rather than stable value priorities. While this debate has not yet been put to rest, it seems clear that measures of postmaterialist values are at least somewhat (and perhaps substantially) responsive to short-term forces.

Even among those who agree that value change is proceeding, the nature of that change is in some dispute. Flanagan (1982, 1987) has argued that Inglehart's model obscures two different patterns of change: one involving a shift from economic to noneconomic values and another from authoritarian to libertarian values. Braithwaite, Makkai, and Pittelkow (1996), using Braithwaite's reinterpretation of Rokeach's freedom/equality model, argue that value change is better interpreted as a shift from security to harmony values.

What are the consequences of this value change? Inglehart's original research (1977) focused on student protests and challenges to political au-

thority. Subsequent research has dealt with issues like the environment and support for "green" parties, nuclear energy, and women's role in society. Correlations between postmaterialist values and these issues are almost always positive, although their magnitude varies substantially. For example, Dalton (2002) reports correlations between postmaterialist values and support for antinuclear groups ranging from .09 to .26 in the United States, Great Britain, France, and western Germany, with a correlation of .01 in eastern Germany. The results are very similar for support for women's rights groups in those countries. These are relatively low correlations, and there is no control for other political or social factors that may be correlated with both values and issue preferences. Postmaterialist values do predict vote choice in western European nations, although the relationship is usually weaker than for the traditional left-right dimension (Knutson, 1995b). Unfortunately, in many of these studies only percentage differences or simple correlations are presented, making it difficult to determine how strong the effects of these values would be in well-specified multivariate models.

While Inglehart's theory and research has received its share of criticism, it has been extremely influential in political science, particularly in studies of European political attitudes, participation, and voting. And Inglehart has worked, perhaps harder than any other value theorist, to develop a theory of value change that can help understand the dynamics of politics in industrialized nations. An empirical comparison of Inglehart's materialist/postmaterialist value dimension with Schwartz's structural model could help to integrate two major lines of research on the crossnational dynamics of value systems (one in political science and one in psychology).

I conclude this section with an interesting example of how the study of social values can shed light on social and political processes. Utilizing data on values that he has collected in many nations, Schwartz (1997) explored the potential effects of communism on societal values. Specifically, he compared samples of public school teachers and college students in 9 eastern European countries with comparable samples from 11 western European nations. All of the samples were obtained between 1989 and 1993.

Schwartz found substantively large differences in values in several important domains. The eastern Europe samples were all higher in conservatism values (his conformity, tradition, and security value types) than the every one of the western Europe samples. The eastern Europe sample were also higher on average in hierarchy (power) values than the western Europe samples, though the differences were not quite as pronounced. Conversely, the eastern Europe samples were lower in affective autonomy (stimulation) and intellectual autonomy (self-direction) values and, interestingly, egalitarian (universalism and benevolence) values. As with the conservatism values, all nine eastern Europe nations had lower means on egalitarian values than each of the western Europe nations. These differences appear to withstand simple controls for variables like religion and economic development. The

eastern European value patterns certainly don't fit expectations about "socialist" societies, although, as Schwartz argues, they may be the consequences of authoritarian regimes.

As Schwartz notes, the best design to examine the effects of different political systems on societal values would be to have repeated samples over time in countries that experience changes in political systems. In the absence of such studies, data like this can provide important evidence of the consequences of sociopolitical structures on values and, ultimately, on the attitudes necessary to foster democracy. Since it is likely that younger people will be most affected by changes in political systems, even samples from after political change should be useful, as the values of younger people should be increasingly different from older people in the society in predictable ways.

▲ *Conclusion: Values, Politics, and Political Ideology*

Even a review of this length must be quite selective, and there is a great deal of research on values that I have not been able to discuss. My goal has been to suggest how values can help political psychologists understand the structure of political attitudes. The search for attitude organization has been one of the major concerns of research in political science and psychology. While no single approach to this problem will suffice, there is now a substantial amount of evidence that values are a major source of structure for political attitudes. I have reviewed some of this evidence, but I have also tried to show how recent theories and research can advance our understanding much further. Psychologists have made substantial contributions to the study of values since Rokeach's book was published in 1973. Yet political psychologists often ignore this work and incorporate values into their research in a piecemeal fashion. For many purposes this may suffice. Discoveries that equality is a major predictor of social welfare attitudes (Feldman, 1988) or that individualism is not a major predictor of racial attitudes (Kinder & Mendelberg, 2000) are important findings in their own right. But there is reason to believe that attention to broader value structures may be even more fruitful.

The relationship among values is especially important as we move from understanding specific attitudes to attitude organization and ideology. Finding an underlying, simple structure to values may provide a basis for linking individual and societal value priorities to fundamental social and political conflicts. This is one of the promising aspects of Schwartz's value theory. By linking values to basic human needs and motivations, Schwartz sets out a systematic way of thinking about the relationship among values. The two-dimensional structure apparent in the associations among the values may provide the foundation for a value-based model of ideology. Greater atten-

tion to a theory of value structure and a more comprehensive measure of values may have considerable value for political psychology.

As I have emphasized throughout, there are still many questions surrounding the use of values in political psychology research. We know too little about the stability of values and the extent to which they are exogenous to political attitudes. We need to learn more about the conditions under which values are most strongly related to attitudes. Theories of values give us too little guidance to predict which values will structure particular political attitudes. Much more work is necessary to determine the ultimate value of values for political psychology.

Notes

1. Instrumental values refer to "modes of conduct" while terminal values involve "end-states of existence." Subsequent research has generally failed to support this distinction (see Schwartz, 1992).
2. In addition, virtually all of Rokeach's analysis was with samples from the United States. This obviously prevented him from assessing any cultural variation in value content and structure.
3. The list began originally as eight types, was expanded to 11, and then reduced to 10 when one type—spirituality—failed to emerge from the analysis.
4. McCann reports an unstandardized stability coefficient of .49.
5. A priori differences in societal values are sometimes derived from general observations of societal characteristics (based perhaps on anthropological studies) or from one of the handful of quantitative studies of cross-national value differences, primarily the work of Hofstede (1980).

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